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The Erosion of Informed Consent to Abortion
Kali Ann Trahanas

I. INTRODUCTION
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 1 Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun stated, "[t]he States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal
health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."2 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court overruled this position in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey. 3 In a plurality opinion, the Casey Cour1 upheld an informed consent statute and set forth

a new standard for evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that regulate abortion, known as the
"undue burden" standard. 4 One of the Court's primary motivations for promulgating this new
standard was to allow states, in their regulation of abortion, to express their preference for
childbirth. 5 Contrary to Justice Blackmun's proclamation, today, under the undue burden
standard, states are free to intimidate women into continuing their pregnancies under the guise of
protecting maternal health and potential

life.~>

The question before the circuit courts is whether

states may do so by disguising their moral propaganda as medically accurate and relevant
infonnation, and by coercing physicians to deliver this ideology as a part of the process of
infonned consent to the abortion procedure.'

1

476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) overruled by Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id.
3
505 u.s. 833 (1992).
4
ld.
s Id.
6
Id
7
See, e.g.• Texas Med. Providers Perfonning Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 20 12); Planned
Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S.
Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). See also Stuart v. Huff, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2011 WL 6740400
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 2011) a.fl'd, No. 12-1052,2013 WL 265083 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2013).
2

The American Medical Association (AMA) defines informed consent as "a process pf
communication between a patient and physician that results in the patient's authorization or
agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention.''8 On the AMA website, notably under the
heading "Patient Physician Relationship Topics," the AMA lists a number of guidelines that
physicians should follow in conducting the process of informed consent. 9 The AMA suggests
that physicians performing the procedure discuss the diagnosis, nature, purpose, risks, and
benefits of the suggested treatment, alternative treatments and their risks and benefits, and the
risks and benefits of refraining from treatment altogether. 10 Nowhere does the AMA suggest that
physicians offer patients their own individual moral or political opinions about a given treatment,
let alone states' moral and political viewpoints. 11 In fact, AMA guidelines do not suggest that
states play any role in shaping the informed consent dialogue, except to say that obtaining
informed consent is both a legal and ethical obligation. 12
While the process of informed consent adheres to AMA guidelines for most medical
procedures, the process of informed consent to an abortion has strayed drastically from that
paradigm. 13 This shift is primarily attributable to the Supreme Court's decisions in Casey' 4 and

Gonzalez v. Carhart. 1s Some states have argued that the holdings of these cases give them
license to commandeer the physician-patient relationship in the context of abortion, so as to
ensure that "so grave a choice is well informed." 16 Apparently these states do not consider the

8

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, https://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/physician-rcsourccs/legal-topicslpatientfhvsician-rclationship-topics/informcd-conscnt.page {last visited January 21, 20 13). (emphasis added).

Jd
10 ld

II

Jd.

12/d.
13

Stale Policies In Brief Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,

GUTIMACHER

http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib MWPA.pdf(last visited January 21, 2013).
14
Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 {1992).
IS 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
16/d.

?

INSTITUTE,

standard process of informed consent, which is both ethically and legally adequate to inform
patients of all relevant information for every other medial procedure, to be sufficient to ensure
informed consent to the abortion procedure. 17 Or perhaps it is women's ability to make informed
decisions that these states question. 18

Whatever their motivation, these states have taken

advantage of the wide latitude the aforementioned Supreme Court cases have afforded them, and
have reformed their informed consent statutes in the context of abortion. 19
Previously, informed consent statutes typically consisted of a number of topics that
physicians were required to discuss with their patients, but physicians still had the discretion to
decide the specific content of the conversation. 20 Physicians were free to convey information
regarding each topic that they, in their judgment, believed to be most accurate, credible, and
germane to their patients' specific circumstances. 21 Recently revised informed consent statutes,
however, require that physicians convey specific information that states consider accurate,

17

Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 ("Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before
viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful
and informed. Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in
favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of
unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance ifthe mother chooses to raise the child herself.").
18
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 223, 224-25 (2009) ("Carhart's portrayal of women evokes a century-old societal view of femininity. The
Carhart Court's cabined view of women's decision-making capacity reflects a gender-stereotyped view of women's
nature. The Court also exposed its discriminatory view of women as decision-makers by articulating a new paradigm
of "informed consent" in the abortion context that controverts well-established rules of patients' right to informed
consent in healthcare law. This article focuses on Carhart's disturbing reasoning--that competent adult women lack
the capacity to determine for themselves what is best for their own health--and evaluates its implications in the
abortion context and in other areas of medical treatment related to pregnancy.").
19
State · Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUITMACHER INSTITUTE,
http://www .guttmachcr.orglstatcccntcrlspibs/spib MW PA.pdf (last visited January 21, 20 13 ). See also cases cited
supra note 7 pp. l.
20
See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999).
21
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,67 (1976). See also Amanda McMurray Roe,
Not-So-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient Relationship to Promote State-Supported Outcomes, 60 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (2009) ("The relatively recent development of informed consent statutes for specific
procedures, however, seems to have upended the traditional notion of informed consent. Instead of promoting
autonomous choice, these statutes mandate that doctors provide particular disclosures about certain procedures. In
addition, rather than providing patients with objective information, some of these statutes appear to provide patients
with slanted information that pushes them toward a predetermined 'right' choice.").

significant, and relevant. 22 Many of these mandated disclosures consist of information thatis
disputed in the medical community or taken out of context, as well as information that pertains
solely to the embryo or fetus, and not the risks and benefits of the procedure itself. 23
These recently revised informed consent statutes have been subject to constitutional
challenges on both First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 24

The mandated specific

disclosures have been challenged as violating the First Amendment free speech rights of
physicians by unconstitutionally compelling their speech. zs These statutes have also been
challenged as unconstitutionally violating women's privacy rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, by imposing an undue burden upon women's right to an abortion. 26 Statutes
regulating abortion are not evaluated under traditional First or Fourteenth Amendment
principles. 27 Rather, statutes that regulate abortion are analyz~d under the undue burden standard
promulgated in Casey. 28 Some courts have held that these statutes are constitutional under the
undue burden standard, some have held that they are not, and still others have upheld or struck
these statutes on First Amendment grounds. 29
Though, in its disjointed, plurality opinion, the Casey Court did hold that states have the
right to express their preference for childbirth and to persuade women not to have an abortion,
the Court did not intend to allow states covey their preference for childbirth through mandatory
disclosures of inaccurate, misleading, and irrelevant information in the informed consent

22
23

See Casey, 505 U.S. 833 and Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
State Policies In Brief· Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,

GUITMACHER

http://www.guttmachcr.org/statcccntcr/spibs/spib MWPA.pdf (last visited January 21, 20 13).
~~
'ed supra note 7 pp. l .
~ee cases c1t
2S

/d.

26/d.
27

/d See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833 and Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124.

28/d.

29/d
II
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process.30 Unfortunately, due to the combined effects of the confusing and disorganized manner
in which the standard was promulgated and the practice of giving great deference to states, such
a result has been permitted by some courts under the undue burden standard. 31 The troubling
consequence of granting unwarranted deference to states while applying this already unclear and
manipulable standard is erosion of the informed consent process. 32 What was once a private,
personal, and professional dialogue between physicians and their patients concerning medicaily
objective and relevant information is warping into a monologue of legislatively coerced
recitations of anti-abortion propaganda. 33
This Comment argues in favor of a three-step approach for creating a version of the
undue burden standard that will prevent this erosive result and effectuate the intent of the Casey
Court. First, this Comment suggests restructuring the currently malleable and shapeless undue
burden standard into a three-prong test. 34 Organizing the elements of the undue burden standard
into a structured, three-prong, disjunctive test will require courts to engage in a complete
analysis, and prevent them from manipulating the undue burden standard by emphasizing just

30

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 872, 878-82 (1992) ("[l]fthe information the
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
~ermissible.") (emphasis added).
1
See generally Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. I, 45-49 (2012).
32
/d. at 66-67 ("There is no doubt that the abortion-specific biased counseling statutes discussed fail the AMA 's
ethical standards, especially since the AMA 'opposes legislative measures that would impose procedure-specific
requirements for informed consent or a waiting period for any legal medical procedure.' The requirement that
physicians present facts accurately disqualifies deceptive and misleading statements. Making statements that the
patient does not want to hear is unethical according to the AMA, and the patient's expressed desire not to be given
certain information should be respected. Finally, there is nothing that provides support for forcing patients to be
exposed to the results of an ultrasound against their wishes.").
33
/d. at 70 ("Abortion opponents have attempted to co-opt the doctrine of informed consent to further their political
goal of reducing the number of abortions .... This vision should be rejected, as should the cynical use ofthe banner
of informed consent to disguise an anli-abortion agenda . .. biased counseling laws ... cannot be part of ethical
informed consent practices because they are designed to make women's choices regarding ending their pregnancies
less well-informed and less voluntary, all in the hope of discouraging abortions.") (emphasis added).
34
Casey, 505 U.S. at 930, 985-86 ("the Roe framework is far more administrable, and far Jess manipulable, than the
undue burden standard adopted by the joint opinion.") (Biackmun,. J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
and ("[l]ts efforts at clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently manipulable and will prove
hopelessly unworkable in practice.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).

one of the elements. 35 Under this proposed test, the burden is on the p laintiff challeng ing the
statute to demonstrate that ( I) the mandated disclosure or disclosures are (a) not truthful, (b)
misleading, or (c) irrelevant to the abortion procedure; (2) the statute is not calculated to infonn
women's decision, and therefore bas an improper purpose; or (3) the statute has the effect of
creating a substantial obstacle for women seeking an aborti on. 36 If a plaintiff is able to
demonstrate any of the above, the statute fai ls the undue burden ana lysis and is struck down as
an unconstitutional undue burden on women's Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to an
abortion . Courts must engage in an exhaustive analysis of each prong before detennining that a
challenged statute is constitutional.
Next, this Comment proposes that each s ubpart of the firs t prong of the analysis, namely,
whether the infonnation is truth ful , non-misleading, and relevanl to the abortion procedure, mus t
be evaluated independently.37 for example, courts should not assume that infonnation is nonm isleading based solely on a finding that the in fom1ation is truthfu l, as truthful infonnati oo that
is taken out of context can certainly be misleading. 38 Final ly, this Comment argues for decreased
legislati ve deference in evaluating the first and second prongs of the analysis. 39

Where

35

See supra note 30 pp. 5 and infra note 38.
See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. Each of the elements of the suggested th ree-prong analysis is present in the
Casey joint opinion. The solution lies both in organizing the elements in a way that is more rigid and easier to

36

apply, and in making the additional proposed adjustments in applying the rigid version of the standard.
37
See infra note 38 .
38
Ian Vandewalker, Aborrion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical
Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. I, 62 (20 12) ("Biased counseling laws go further than the requi rements just
mentioned, however. They include exaggerated and misleading information about risks of serious outcomes like
infertility and psychological problems. Such statements violate commu nicative norms requiring adequate accuracy
and the inclusion of quali fying statements. For example, Michigan requires that patients be told that as the result of
an abortion, some women may experience depression, fee lings of guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or
sex, or anger. This statement is literally true, but it omits relevant qualifications. Most women who get abortions do
not experience significant problems like those mentioned, and most women who do have negative psychological
outcomes after abortions experienced other stressors prior to and d istinct fro m their abortions. The statement is
calculated to mislead patients into thinking the risk is greater than it really is, which makes it a violation of the
efisremic norms that govern in formed consent transactions.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
Casey, 505 U. S. at 925 ("The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction,
not the group for whom the law is irre levant. Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert testimony,
empirical studies, and common sense, whether in a large fraction of the cases in which the restriction is relevant, it

disclosures of medical fact are involved, deference is more properly allocated to the weight ·of
medical evidence and the majority view of the medical community, not the opinion of the
legislature. 4° Furthermore, it is inappropriate to defer to the stated legislative purpose where the

-

distinction between a proper purpose (to persuade) and an improper purpose (to hinder) is so
fine. 41 Adopting the suggested approach will enable courts to apply the undue burden standard in
a way that permits the states to further their interests protecting potential life and expressing their
preference for childbirth, while also affording greater protection to women's Fourteenth
Amendment privacy right to an abortion.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on the history and fundamental
principles of informed consent.

Part III reviews the Supreme Court cases that have shaped

abortion jurisprudence and promulgated the standards for evaluating the constitutionality of
informed consent statutes, with a focus on the landmark cases Case/ 2 and Carhart. 43 Part IV
discusses four federal circuit court opinions that have explicitly acknowledged the existence of
confusion and inconsistency in courts' application of the undue burden standard. 44 Part IV then

will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
40
Jd See also Vandewalker supra note 38, at 13-33.
41
Casey, 505 U.S. at 986-97 ("The joint opinion explains that a state regulation imposes an undue burden if it has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus. An obstacle is substantial, we are told, if it is calculated, not to inform the woman's free choice, but to hinder
it. This latter statement cannot possibly mean what it says. Any regulation of abortion that is intended to advance
what the joint opinion concedes is the State's substantial interest in protecting unborn life will be calculated to
hinder a decision to have an abortion. It thus seems more accurate to say that the joint opinion would uphold
abortion regulations only if they do not unduly hinder the woman's decision. That, of course, brings us right back to
square one: Defining an undue burden as an undue hindrance (or a substantial obstacle) hardly clarifies the test.
Consciously or not, the joint opinion's verbal shell game will conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is
'appropriate' abortion legislation.")(Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42
Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
43
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
44
Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th
Cir. 1999); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) on reh'g en bane, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); A
Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).

7

provides examples of confused, conflated and inconsistent application of the undue burden
standard through an analysis of two recent circuit court cases. 4s
Lastly, Part V provides an in depth discussion of the proposed solution.46 This section
addresses why each of recommended adjustments to the standard is important, and why making
all of these adjustments together is a better approach than making any one of them alone. Part_V
suggests that reformulating the standard with each of the proposed changes will generate an
undue burden standard that allows the states to appropriately express their interest in potential
life, while also adequately protecting women's right to terminate a pregnancy. This Comment
concludes by briefly discussing the public policy perils of failing the reform the problematic
undue burden standard, as well as the public policy benefits of adopting the proposed solution.
II. INFORMED CONSENT TO MEDICAL PROCEDURES

The central guiding principles of informed consent are patient autonomy and selfdetermination. 47 There are five elements to informed consent: ( 1) disclosure, (2) understanding,
(3) voluntariness, (4) competence, and (5) consent. 48 This Comment focuses on disclosure aiid
voluntariness, although the issue of competence becomes prominent in the abortion context with
regard to the informed consent of minors attempting to obtain an abortion. 49
Disclosure is the most pertinent element of informed consent for purposes of this
Comment, as the majority of constitutional challenges to recent informed consent statutes focus

4

See cases cited supra note 7, pp. 1.
See supra pp. S-6.
47
Hana Osman, History and Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4 INT'L ELECTRONIC J. OF HEALTH
$

46

Eouc. 41,44-45 (2001}, http://www.aahperd.org/loader.cfm?csModule=securitvlgetfile&pageid=39142 (last visited
February 22, 20 13).
48/d
49

See, e.g., Causeway Med. Suite v. leyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997) overruled by Okpalobi v. Foster, 244
F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (during judicial bypass to parental consent or notification statutes burden is on minor to
show that she is mature and well-informed or else that an abortion is in her best interests).

on provisions involving mandatory informational disclosures. so Within the disclosure element
are three different standards of informed consent. 51 The first is the professional practice
standard, which emphasizes the patients' best medical interests. s2 The reasonable person
standard, on the other hand, places the most emphasis on patient autonomy and selfdetermination. 53 Finally, the subjective standard suggests that maximization of autonomy
requires the quantity and quality of information to be tailored to each of the individual patients
based on their needs. 54 The subjective standard is arguably preferable, but each of these
standards has its respective strengths and weaknesses. 55
Voluntariness is also critical to obtaining informed consent. 56 Voluntary agreement to a
given treatment is central to patient autonomy and self determination, because patients are only
able to make educated and rational decisions if they are not being manipulated, pressured, or
coerced to elect an option to which they are resistant.S7 Though physicians will inevitably
influence their patients' decisions to some degree, the process of informed consent fails if
physicians coerce their patients to select a given course of treatment. 58 Manipulation can be
considered a form of coercion in the context of informed consent because it diminishes the
patients' capacity to arrive at intelligent and informed decisions.s 9 As such, decisions that result

so Roe, supra note 21, pp. 4. See also cases cited supra note 7, pp. I.
51

Osman,
supra
note
47,
pp.
8
at
44-45
(2001),
httn://www .aahperd.org/loadcr.cfm?csModulc=security/gctfilc&pagcid=39142 (last visited February 22, 20 13).

s2Jd.

53/d
54/d

ss ld
56/d
51
Hana Osman, History and Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4 INT'L ELECTRONIC J. OF HEALTH
EDUC. 41,44-45 (2001), http://www.aahpcrd.org/loadcr.cfm?csModule=sccurity/gctfilc&pagcid=39142 (last visited
February 22, 2013)(citing EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO AND DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDICAL
PRACTICE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993)).
58/d
59
Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Viola/ions of Meditl,al
Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 36 (20 12).

Q

from the usc of manipulative tactics do not meet the voluntariness requirement of infonned
consent because the decisions are not considered patients' own free choice.60
Today, most states' informed consent stanttes have more stringent requirements for the
abortion procedure than are required for any other medical proccdure. 61 The provisions of
informed consent statutes that apply to abortion arc not only harsh and inflexible, some go as far
as requiring misleading statements to be made to patients.62 Under these statutes, states mandate
the delivery of certain materials and information that they claim is essential to the process
obtaining women's informed consent to an abortion. (I) In reality, however, these so-called
informed consent laws undetmine the goals of informed consent by disseminating false or
incomplete infonnation. 64 These so-called infom1ed consent statutes, which are more accurately
described as anti-abortion stanttes, undennine the principle of patient autonomy and demote
patient well being, the primary tenets and goals of informed consent.65 Nevertheless, these antiabortion laws are being passed by state legislatures under the guise of informed consent, and are
being upheld by some courts under the protection of the amorphous undue burden standard. 66

TTJ.

EVOLUTION OF lNr:oRMED CONSENT STATUTES FOR ABORTION PROCEDURES TH ROUGH
SUPREME COURT .JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Road To Casey

States' abil ity to regulate abortion through informed consent statutes has varied over the
past forty years. The Un ited States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade61 that women's ability to

60 !d.
61 !d.

/d.
!d.
64 !d.
65
Vandewalker, supra note 59 at 45-49.
66
See, e.g.. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 J7.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
67
410 U.S. 113 (1973) holding modified by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
62

6)

1/)

choose whether to terminate their pregnancy is a fundamental right. 6R The Court balanced the
competing interests of women and states, and adhered to the traditional Fourteenth Amendment
practice of applying strict scrutiny to fundamental rights.M The result was the "trimester
framework," which mandated no intetference whatsoever from the state in the first trimester of
women's pregnancies. 70 The trimester framework allowed limited regulation in the second
trimester, permitting only regulation that was intended to preserve the life or health of women. 71
States had broadest authority to regulate the abortion procedure in the third trimester. 12 Under
the trimester framework, states were permitted to enact statutes that regulated third trimester
abortions if the statutes were designed to preserve the life or health of women or the potential
life of the fetus. 73
Despite the trimester ti·amework's alleged prohibition of states' interference during the
first trimester of women's pregnancies, the Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.

Danforth 74 upheld an infonned consent statute for pre-viability abortion under Roe. 7s The
Court's decision to uphold a statute requiring women to sign an informed consent form before
obtaining a first-trimester abortion was the Supreme Court's first decision to uphold regulation
during the first trimester through informed consent under Roe's trimester framework. 76 Unaware
of the floodgates that they were opening, the Court held that requiring written informed consent

68

/d. ("As recently as last Term, in Eisenstadt v. Baird we recognized the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
69/d
70 ld
71/d
12/d

73

Roe, 410 U.S. 113 at 164-65.

428 u.s. 52 (1976).
ld at 67.
76
See supra note 70, pp. I 0.
74

15

11

to abortion was no different than requiring infonned consent for any other medical procedure. 77
Further, they opined that this holding did not single out the abortion procedure, but rather
included it among all other medical procedures for which informed consent was required. 7K Tnis
was also the first case in which the Court suggested that, due to the nature of the abortion
decision, the state has an interest in ensuring the decision is fully informed. 79
A few years later, in City ofA/,:ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, lnc./ 11 the
Court acknowledged states' interest in ensuring that women's decisions are informed, as
described in Danforth, but struck down the informed consent provision on the grounds that it was
an unconstitutional violation of women's Fourteenth Amendment right to and abortion. 81

The

Court held that the informed consent provision was invalid because it did not give physicians
adequate discretion to determine what information to tell patients, considering their specific,
individual circumstances. 112 The Court also concluded that the statute was impermissibly
attempting to persuade women to continue their pregnancies. 83
Though the majority in Akron struck down the informed consent provision on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, the Court suggested in dicta that informed consent statutes can violate the

77

Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.

18/d.
79

Id. ("The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative
that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and
her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of
requiring her prior written consent.").
·
80
462 U.S. 416 (1983) overruled by Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
81
ld. at 443.
82
Id. ("It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed to
his patient, depending on her particular circumstances. Danforth's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring that
this information be given will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth.").
83
Id. at 444. {holding that the statute "attempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring 'informed consent' beyond
permissible limits" because "the information required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether.").

I?

First Amendment as well.~ 4 This serves as an interesting point of reference, because while the
Court here was only beginning to consider the First Amendment implications of informed
consent statutes, infonned consent statutes are repeatedly challenged on both First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds today. 85 While questions regarding the interaction of the
..
First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis of informed consent statutes sprouted from the
majority's dicta, the dissenting opinion seems to have planted the seed tor the undue burden
standard.86 The dissent proposed the undue burden standard as a possible analytical framework
for abortion cases, but also suggested that deference to legislative determinations regarding
whether a given regulation is '"unduly burdensome" is not appropriate. 87
Another informed consent statute was held invalid in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,~<x under similar reasoning as that expressed in Akron. 89 Citing
Akron, the Court again ruled on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, striking the infonned consent
84

/d. at 472 ("This is not to say that the informed consent provisions may not violate the First Amendment rights of
the physician if the State requires him or her to communicate its ideology. However, it does not appear that Akron
Center raised any First Amendment argument in the Court below.").
85
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006) and Planned Parenthood
Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012)(both brought First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges). Compare Texas Mcd. Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570
(5th Cir. 2012)(brought only First Amendment challenges, but court still discussed undue burden).
86
Akron, 462 U.S. at 453. ("In my view, this 'unduly burdensome' standard should be applied to the challenged
regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular 'stage' of pregnancy involved. If the
particular regulation does not 'unduly burden' the fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited
to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.")(internal citations omitted).
87
Akron, 462 U.S. at 465. ("The 'unduly burdensome' standard is appropriate not because it incorporates deference
to legislative judgment at the threshold stage of analysis, but rather because of the limited nature of the fundamental
right that has been recognized in the abortion cases. Although our cases do require that we 'pay careful attention' to
the legislative judgment before we invoke strict scrutiny, it is not appropriate to weigh the state interests at the
threshold stage.")(internal citations omitted).
88
476 U.S. 747 (1986) overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (I 992).
89
ld. at 764. (The statute required "that the woman be informed by the physician of 'detrimental physical and
psychological effects' and of all 'particular medical risks' compound the problem of medical attendance, increase
the patient's anxiety, and intrude upon the physician's exercise of proper professional judgment. This type of
compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent. That the Commonwealth does not, and surely would
not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the antiabortion character of the statute and its real purpose. Pennsylvania, like Akron, 'has gone far beyond merely
describing the general subject matter relevant to informed consent.' In addition, the Commonwealth would require
the physician to recite its litany 'regardless of whether in his judgment the information is relevant to [the patient's]
personal decision.' These statutory defects cannot be saved by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent
hearing.").

provision down due to the specific and, in the Court's opinion, irrelevant information that the
statute required."~u

The dissenting opinion in Thornburgh also expressly addressed the potential

First Amendment implications of these infonned consent statutes, but contrary to the dissent ..in
Akron, suggested that regulations should be evaluated using rational basis review under which
the states are afforded a heavy dose of deference.'''
Though the dissenting opinions in the aforementioned cases introduced the possibility of
adopting a new standard for evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that regulate abortion,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services92 was really the beginning of the end of Roe.93 The
constitutionality of the informed consent provision of the statute at issue in this case did not
come before the Court because the state did not raise the issue on appeal, but the Court's general
discussion in this case made it abundantly clear that the trimester framework would soon be
abolisbed. 94 Not only did the Court explicitly express the intent to abandon the trimester
framework, it also used suggested that state's interest in potential life begins at

conception:~~

This opinion sets the stage perfectly for Casey and the abandonment of the trimester
framework. 96 Interestingly, however, even in a case that so clearly set the stage for Casey, the
Court's dicta suggested that a provision of that statute, which was comparable to the speech-anddisplay ultrasound requirements that have been appearing in recent informed consent statutes,
90

Id. at 830. (Addressing the First Amendment issue, the Court wrote, "I do not dismiss the possibility that requiring
the physician or counselor to read aloud the State's printed materials if the woman wishes access to them but cannot
read raises First Amendment concerns. Even the requirement that women who can read be informed of the
availability of those materials, and furnished with them on request, may create some possibility that the physician or
counselor is being required to •communicate [the State's] ideology."').
91
/d. at 789-90.
92
492 u.s. 490 (1989).
93
See supra note 86, pp. 13.
94
Webster, 492 U.S. at 518.
95
Id ("This Court has emphasized that Roe implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and the preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment ...
There is also no reason why the State's compelling interest in protecting potential human life should not extend
throughout pregnancy rather than coming into existence only at the point of viability. Thus, the Roe trimester
framework should be abandoned.").
96/d.
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would have violated the physician's First Amendment right to free speech through content-based
regulation of speech. 97
B. Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Penmylvania v. Casey

The Supreme Court's opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey') 8 began with the memorable line,"[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'>99

Ironically, however, the Casey plurality opinion introduced a standard that has created
tremendous doubt and ambiguity an already confused and controversial abortion jurisprudence. 100
In one foul swoop, the Supreme Court (1) manipulated the essential holdings of Roe v. Wade to
include the word "undue," which allowed for exponentially more regulation of abortion, 101 (2)
disposed of the trimester framework and the application of strict scrutiny to the statutes that
regulate abortion, 102 (3) overturned Akron 103 and Thornburgh 10f, which held that abortion
informed consent laws cannot intentionally influence a woman's choice, 10s and (4) neglected to
apply the Salerno 106 standard for facial challenges. 107

97

ld at 512. ("In a separate opmaon, Judge Arnold argued that Missouri's prohibition violated the First
Amendment because it 'sharply discriminate[s] between kinds of speech on the basis of their viewpoint: a physician,
for example, could discourage an abortion, or counsel against it, while in a public facility, but he or she could not
encourage or counsel in favor of it.'").
98
505 u.s. 833 (1992).
99
/d. at 844.
100
See, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 585 (5th Cir. 2012)
("Today we abide Casey, whose force much of the argument here fails to acknowledge. It bears reminding that Roe
survived Casey only in a recast form ... We must and do apply today's rules as best we can without hubris and with
less sureness than we would prefer....").
101
Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 ("Whatever the 'central holding' of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes
dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion
instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere
facade to give the illusion ofreality.")(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102
/d at 993 ("It seems particularly ungrateful to carve the trimester framework out of the core of Roe, since its very
rigidity (in sharp contrast to the utter indeterminability of the 'undue burden' test) is probably the only reason the
Court is able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe 'has in no sense proven unworkable,'") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
103
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 {1983).
104
Thornburgh v. Am. Coil. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 ( 1986).
aos See Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-449 and Thornburgh, 416 U.S. at 760 ("(W]e have consistently rejected state efforts
to prejudice a woman's choice, either by limiting the information available to her, or by 'requir[ing] the delivery of
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1. The Undue Burden Standard
The undue burden standard was set forth in the plurality opinion of Casey. 108 In the most
complete a1ticulation of the standard in the disjointed plurality opinion, the Court explained:
"A findi ng of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regu lation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substanti al obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be ca lculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or some other va lid state
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible
mea ns of serving its legitimate ends. " 109
This explanation, however, is circular, and fails to adequately define the key terms that,
together, compose this standard. 110 Instead of offering any clear definitions or objective criteria,
the plurality attempted to clarify the standard by providing hypothetical examples of what it
might have considered an undue burden, and what it would not. 111 These examples, many of

information designed 'to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth."')(intcmal citations
omitted).
106 United States v. Salerno, 48 1 U.S. 739 ( 1987).
107 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 94 1-42 ( 1992) ("THE CH IEF JUSTICE then further weakens the test by providing an
insurmountable requirement for facia l challenges: Petitioners must 'show that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [provision] would be valid.' In short, in his view, petitioners must prove that the statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to anyone.") (internal citations om itted). The "insurmountable requirement" the Chief
Justice had suggested is the Salerno standard, which is the traditional standard for facial challenges, but which has
since been replaced by the undue burden standard articulated in Casey in the abortion context. See Fargo Women's
Health Org. v. Sch:1fer, 18 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1994) (''[T)he facial chal!l.:nge standard should include a factual
inquiry in abortion regulation cases. Justice O'Connor wrote: ' In striking down the Pennsylvania Jaw, we did not
require [plaintiffs] to show that the provision would be invalid in all circumstances.' Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Souter, emphasized that a law constitutes an 'undue burden,' and is therefore invalid, if' in a large fraction of
the cases in which [the Jaw] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion."') (internal citations omitted). See also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,483 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In Casey. the
Court appears to have tempered, if not rejected, Salerno's stringent "no set of circumstances" standard in the
abortion context, without expressly saying so.").
lOS fd. at 877.
109 Jd.
110 See supra note 41, pp. 7 and accompanying text.
111 Jd. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 876-902.
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which will be discussed briefly here, were offered in a disjointed, piecemeal discussion of the
standard in what amounted to a seventy-page decision. 112
The "substantial obstacle" inquiry is a disjunctive test with two parts: purpose and
effect. 113 Under this test, a statute is unconstitutional if it either was intended to present a
substantial obstacle (purpose), or, despite the integrity of its purpose, if it has the effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to women seeking to exercise their right to an abortion. 114 The
"purpose" inquiry can be further deconstructed, to the question of whether the statute has been
calculated to inform or, instead, to hinder women's decisions. liS
Statutes present an unconstitutional undue burden if the measures chosen by states are
"calculated to hinder" women's free choice. 116 When evaluating whether statutes are calculated
to hinder women's free choice or not, the analysis must be centered on those who are actually
affected by the restriction. 111 If a statute imposes a more stringent requirement upon minors
seeking an abortion, for example, the focus of the inquiry is how that class of minors is affected;
it wouldn't matter if the class of minors comprised only a small proportion of the total group of
women seeking abortions. 118 The Supreme Court explained that lower courts should engage in an
analysis led by facts, studies, testimony, and common sense to determine if, of the women

112/d.
113

ld at877.

114/d.
liS

Id

ll6Jd
111

Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 ("[T]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.").
118 Jd.
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affected by the statute, it would act as a substantial obstacle in a "large fraction" 119 of those

cases. 120
The Court gave two examples of cases in which statutes would hinder women's free

-·

choice, and therefore have an impermissible purpose. 121 First, the Court explained, unnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to women
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden and are unconstitutional. 122 Unfortunately, the
Court did not shed any light on what is considered an "unnecessary" health regulation, nor did it
give an explanation of when or how an "unnecessary" health regulation could be calculated to
inform a woman's choice. 123 The Court stopped short of saying outright that if a health
regulation is unnecessary, it is calculated to hinder a woman's choice, although that is arguably
the only reasonable inference. 124
Statutes that strip women of the ability to make the decision to have an abortion before
their pregnancies proceed beyond the point of viability would also fit the Court's paradigm of
statutes that are calculated to hinder women's choice. 12s This implicitly suggests that states may
prohibit women from making the ultimate decision to terminate their pregnancies after
viability. 126 This was true even under Roe's trimester framework. 121 This also imprudently

119

At least one court has struggled to determine when a group becomes a "large fraction" such that the effect of the
statute would warrant invalidating the statute. See A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305
F .3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
12
Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 ("Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert testimony, empirical studies,
and common sense, whether 'in a large fraction of the cases in which [the restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion! 'A statute with this purpose is invalid because the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it. "')(internal citations omitted).
121
Id. at 878.
122 Id
121 Id

°

124Jd
12

s Id. at 879.

126

Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) {"For the stage subsequent to viability
the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscri~e,
abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
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implies that states may prohibit women from making the earliest possible decision to terminate
her pregnancy, as long as the ultimate decision is theirs. 128 It was imprudent of the Court to
neglect to address this inference because it makes it impossible to distinguish statutes that
unconstitutionally "hinder" women from obtaining abortions, from those that constitutionally
delay them, since to hinder is, by definition, ..to cause delay, interruption or difficulty in." 129
Nevertheless, this rationale led the Court to uphold the twenty-four hour mandatory
waiting period at issue in the case. 130 The Court opined that requiring a woman to wait at least
twenty-four hours between being given certain information and having an abortion is not a
substantial obstacle. 131 The Plaintiffs had presented the Court with evidence that the mandated
twenty-four hours waiting period often resulted in a delay of a week or more before women
could obtain the procedure. 132 Despite having emphasized the importance of implementing a
highly factual analysis involving testimony and studies in earlier parts of the opinion, the Court
failed to engage in a highly factual analysis on the real effects of the waiting period. 133 Instead
the Court insensitively, or perhaps unknowingly, made light of this waiting period, without
giving any recognition or acknowledgement to the prolonged difficulties and discomforts of
pregnancy that the women had to endure during the mandatory waiting period. 134

mother."). Sadly, the protections of the trimester framework have been abandoned, but the ability to hinder women
from choosing an abortion is part of little binding precedent that has remained of the holding in Roe.
127 /d.
128
/d. al 885-888.
129
Hinder Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.rcfcrcncc.comlbrowsclhindcr?s=t (last visited Mar. I,
2013)
130 ld
131

/d.

132

/d. at 921 ("While a general requirement that a physician notify her patients about the risks of a proposed medical
procedure is appropriate, a rigid requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in practice) much longer
to evaluate the significance of information that is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an irrational and,
therefore, 'undue' burden.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133/d
134/d.
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The Court also offered examples of statutes the Court would find to be calculated Jo

inform women's free choice, and therefore be constitutional. m First, the Court would find
statutes that require information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to
have an abortion to be calculated to inform women's choice. 136 Unfortunately, no guidelines
were supplied that would instruct lower courts how to determine whether the given information
is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. 137 While the question of truth may seem easy to
discern, it can become quite difficult in the face of disputed medical and scientific evidence:m
The Court, evidently, did not consider the possibility of inconclusive or disputed medical
authority, or the potential for states to exaggerate the credibility of ill-supported studies and
information when promulgating the undue burden standard. 139 Determining when information-is
misleading, despite its veracity, is an entirely separate concern that went unaddressed by the
Court. For example, truthful information can often be misleading when taken out of context.
This omission has led some lower courts to automatically conclude that if information is truthful,
it is therefore non-misleading, which is certainly not always true. 140
Next, the Court explained that states are free to enact measures that are intended to
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion, even if the measures do not further a
health interest. 141 In other words, the Court implied that unnecessary health regulations are
acceptable, so long as they do not have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of
13

s Casey, 505 U.S. 833,882 (1992).
/d. ("If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the
requirement may be permissible. We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman
seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those
consequences have no direct relation to her health .. .informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that
all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.").
t37 Id
138
See generally supra note 38, pp. 6-7.
136

139/d.
140

Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir. 2012). See

also supra note 38, pp. 6-7.
141
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
70

the woman seeking an abortion. 142 While this explanation was presumably intended to inform
courts of when a state regulation is permissible, it directly contradicts the Court's previous
proclamation, that unnecessary health regulations that impose a substantial obstacle
unconstitutionally hinder women's right to an abortion. 143 The trouble is that the Court did
sufficiently explain when a permissible obstacle becomes a "substantial obstacle." 144 Thus, lower
courts are required to engage in a factual analysis, but are not given any instruction on how to
weigh the facts or how to determine when something is a permissible burden or impermissible
substantial obstacle and thus, an unconstitutional undue burden. 145
Again, while the Court stresses that states may persuade women to choose childbirth but
may not impose an undue burden on their right to choose, it is almost impossible to determine
whether statutes are successfully persuading women to choose childbirth or, rather,
unconstitutionally hindering women from obtaining abortions. 146 If statutes are designed to
persuade women to choose childbirth over abortion, success in achieving that goal would be
measured by a reduction in the rate of abortions. The Court has said, however, that a decrease in
"a large fraction" of women having an abortion is evidence that the regulation was calculated to
hinder, not inform the woman's choice. 147 The fact that one result can be used to measure the
success of a permissible goal or to demonstrate an impermissible purpose is highly problematic;
The Court briefly explained, on the one hand, that simply making an abortion more costly
or more difficult is not, in itself, an undue burden. 148 On the other hand, the Court held that

142/d
143

!d. at 878.
/d. at 965.
145
ld See also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 480 {7th Cir. 1999) ("When is a burden •undue' as opposed to merely
incidental?").
146
Casey, 505 U.S. at 965.
147
!d. at 925.
148
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 {"Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the
cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact
144
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statutes that prevent a "large fraction" of women from exercising their right to an abortion do
create an undue burden. 1411 There is, of course, a broad range of effects between these two that
the Court did not address, leaving a grey area for lower courts attempting to determine whether
statutes present an undue burden. Without any guidance as to how to navigate that grey are-a,
one approach has been to place the threshold at the latter and hold that as long as statutes do not
virtually ban abortions for the women affected, they are permissible. 150 This cannot be what the
Court intended, however, as such an interpretation would simply be a reiteration of the holding
in Roe. 151 Unfortunately, lower courts are left guessing at where the Court intended the line to be
drawn.
The Court went on to explain "a state measure designed to persuade [a woman] to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. " 152 The Court discussed
two objectives upon making this statement: (1) allowing states, parents, and guardians to express
their "profound respect" for fetal life, and (2) persuading women to choose childbirth over
abortion. 153 By using the words "that goal" it is unclear whether the Court is referring to respect
for fetal life, or whether the statement can be read to mean that any state measure reasonably
related to persuading a woman to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld, so long as it is
that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of
making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
149
Id. at 925.
150
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,480 (7th Cir. 1999).
151
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153-57 ( 1973). See also Casey 505 U.S. at 926 (Justice Blackmun stating that he was
"confident that in the future evidence will be produced to show that 'in a large part of the cases in which [these
regulations are] relevant, (they] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."')
(Biackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting joint opinion, 505 U.S. at 895).
152
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 ("Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her
right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if
they do not constitute an undue burden.") (internal citations omitted).
153
!d. at 878.
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not a "substantial obstacle." 154 Considering the huge ambiguity regarding the meamng of
"substantial obstacle," courts can only hope the latter was not the intended meaning. 155
While the Court spent considerable time discussing the "purpose" prong of the "undue
burden standard," it provided even less guidance with regard to the "effect" prong. 156 To clarify
the "effect" prong, the Court merely explained that a regulation is unconstitutional if it is a
substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose in a "large fraction" of the
cases in the group for whom the law is a restriction. 157 Unfortunately, the "effect" prong suffers
from the same lack of clarity and definitions as the "purpose" prong. This is concerning, since,
without further guidance, there is almost unfettered discretion bestowed upon courts in deciding
whether the effect of a given regulation is "substantial" or not. 158

2. The Dissenting Opinions in Casey
The Justices who dissented in Casey recognized that the standard, as promulgated, was
ambiguous and would be impossible for the lower courts to apply consistently. 159 The first
indication that this standard is flawed lies in the fact that it was a plurality opinion, with four
independently written dissenting opinions in which six Justices partook. 160 The Justice's qualms
with this amorphous standard were made very clear in their dissents; the most vehement dissent
being authored by Justice Scalia. 161

154/d

us /d. at 965.
156
/d at 877-79, 885-97.
157
ld at 965.
158
See supra note 143, pp. 22, and infra note 161.
159
See infra notes 160-61, pp. 24.
160
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 1994) (''The joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter provides the narrowest grounds for the judgments in which various other Justices
concurred to fonn majorities on different issues. Under the rule of Marks, supra note 3, the joint opinion is therefore
cited for the holdings of the Court.").
161
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992).
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Justice Scalia maintained that the joint opinion fai led to sufficiently clarify the undue
burden standard, and that irs fai led attempt only demonstrated further that the standard is
unworkable and easy to manipu late. 162 Justice Scalia then engaged in a discussion about the
problems that lower courts attempting to apply this standard would likely encounter in the
future. 163 The Justice acknowledged the incred ible difficu lty in determining wben a burden
becomes a "substantial burden," and argued that thi s ambiguity invites judges to draw subjective
conclusions and use personal opinions to shape thei r analysis. 1M Justice Scalia predicted there
would be a number of conflicting opinions trying to interpret the undue burden standard as it was
set forth by the plurali ty opinion: 6s Justice Scalia also suggested tbat tbe differing conclusions
of the plurality and dissenters regard ing whether or not the prov isions at issue were "substantial
obstacles" exemplified this

point. 1 ~ 6

C. Relevant Post-Casey Precedent
In Stenberg v. Carhart,l('7 the Court did not evaluate the constituti ona li ty of informed
consent statutes, but this case is imp01iant in understanding the development of abonion
jurisprudence in the context of informed because it evinces the Court's slow but continuous shift
of deference away from phys icians and toward the state. 16R The dissenting opinion analogized
the majority 's reason ing to that of Akron, but disapprovingly called the majority opinion

162

163

ld. at 985- 86.
ld. at 984-93 .

164

Jd. at 992. See also id. at 965 ("In that this standard is based even more on a judge's subjective determinations
than was the trimester framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent 'judges from roaming at large in the
constitutional field' guided only by thei r personal views."'") (citing Griswold \". Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, ,502
(1965)) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
165 Jd. at 965 ("Because the undue burden standard is plucked from nowhere, the questio n of what is a 'substantial
obstacle ' to abortion will undoubtedly engender a variety of conflicting views.").
166
/d. at 985-87.
167
530 u.s. 914 (2000).
168 Jd. at 971 (discussing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I I ( 1905) to support the proposition that there exists
"beyond doubt the right of the legislature to resolve matters upon which physicians disagreed"').
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physician-deferential. 169 The dissent also argued that the state should be able to take a position
when medical authorities are in disagreement, and that the Court should defer to the legislature's
position in such cases. 170

The danger in adopting the dissent's position, however, is that it

allows legislatures, which undeniably have a political agenda, to manipulate and misconstrue
medical findings and facts. 111
The final relevant precedent in understanding the way abortion jurisprudence has shaped
informed consent statutes is Gonzales v. Carhart. 172 The Court in Gonzales essentially adopted
the position that the dissent discussed in Stenberg and adopted a standard of granting deference
to legislative fact-finding as opposed to the weight of the medical evidence. 173 Importantly,
however, the Court stopped short of granting states complete and unfettered discretion, and
explained that the Court has the duty to engage in its own evaluation of both the law and the
facts where fundamental constitutional rights are involved, and especially where district court

169

/d. at 969 {"The Court's decision today echoes the Akron Court's deference to a physician's right to practice
medicine in the way he or she sees fit. The Court, of course, does not wish to cite Akron; yet the Court's holding is
indistinguishable from the reasoning in Akron that Casey repudiated. No doubt exists that today's holding is based
on a physician-first view which finds its primary support in that now-discredited case.").
110
/d. at 970 {"The Court fails to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State to take sides in a medical
debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake and even when leading members of the profession
disagree with the conclusions drawn by the legislature. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct.2072, 138
L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), we held that disagreements among medical professionals 'do not tie the State's hands in setting
the bounds of ... laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the
widest latitude.' /d., at 360, n. 3, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Instead, courts must exercise caution (rather than require
deference to the physician's treatment decision) when medical uncertainty is present.")
171
See generally Joerg Dreweke and Rebecca Wind, State Mandated Aborion Counseling Materials Often Medically
Inaccurate, Biased, (October 26, 2006), http://www.guttmachcr.org/mcdialnr/2006/l 0/26/index.html citing Chinue
Turner Richardson and Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medica/Inaccuracy ofState-Developed Abortion
Counseling Materials, 9 GUTIMACHER POLICY REVIEW 4 (2006),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html.
172
550 u.s. 124 (2007).
m /d. at 163 ("The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical uncertainty persists. The Court's
precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial attack. The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.").

testimony demonstrated its falseness of legislative findings. 174 Naturally, the dissent in Gonazles
criticized the majority for being overly deferential to the legislature. 175
IV.

ABORTION CONFUSION: CIRCUIT COURTS STRUGGLE WITH AMBIGUOUS UNDUE BURDEN

STANDARD, FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES. AND INCREASINGLY MANIPULATIVE INFORMED
CONSENT STATUTES

A number of circuit courts that have applied the undue burden standard to abortion
informed consent statutes have echoed Justice Scalia's concerns, demonstrating that the
obscurity of the undue burden standard has presented the circuit courts with an incredible
challenge. 176

For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.

Sundquist, 111 expressly acknowledged that judges can and, in fact, do disagree regarding the point
at which a burden becomes an unconstitutional "undue burden." 178 The author of the concurrence
did not seem to find this troubling, commenting that this was not surprising given the subjective
nature of the standard. 179

The dissent in Memphis, on the other hand, found this to be very

troublesome, and agreed with Justice Scalia that the undue burden standard was manipulable. 180

174

/d. at 165-66 ("Although we review congressional fact-finding under a deferential standard, we do not in the
circumstances here place dispositive weight on Congress' findings. The Court retains an independent constitutional
duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake . . . As respondents have noted, and the
District Courts recognized, some recitations in the Act are factually incorrect ... Uncritical deference to Congress'
factual findings in these cases is inappropriate.")
17
s /d. at 175 ("The trial courts concluded, in contrast to Congress' findings, that 'significant medical authority
supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D & E] is the safest procedure ... Today's opinion
supplies no reason to reject those findings. Nevertheless, despite the District Courts' appraisal of the weight of the
evidence, and in undisguised conflict with Stenberg, the Court asserts that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act can
survive 'when ... medical uncertainty persists.' This assertion is bewildering. Not only does it defy the Court's
longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no carve-out for circumstances of medical
uncertainty; it gives short shrift to the records before us, carefully canvassed by the District Courts.") (internal
citations omitted).
176
See supra note 44, pp. 7.
177
175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999).
178
/d at 467.
179 /d.
180
/d. at 468. ("Regardless of where an individual stands on the controversial topic of a woman's right to undergo an
abortion, including the right of a minor female to do so without parental consent, this is, in fact, the state of law
which this court is obligated to follow. However, in reversing the district court's imposition of a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of Tennessee's Parental Consent for Abortions by Minors Act of 1995,

The dissent accused the majority of engaging in an incorrect analysis under an improper standard
of review, thereby neglecting its responsibility to adhere to Supreme Court precedent.
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The

dissent even accused the majority of deliberately ignoring some of the district court's fac~.al
findings in order to substitute its own judgment. 1M~
In another case, Karlin v. Foust, 183 the court's bewilderment began as it attempted to
distinguish between a burden that is "undue" and one that is merely "incidental. " 184 The Seventh
Circuit struggled to make sense of the undue burden standard, finally concluding that a burden
that only persuades women is acceptable. 185 A burden is only undue, the court concluded, if
actually prevents women from obtaining an abortion that they would have otherwise had. 186 In
this court's opinion, incidental increase in cost or inconvenience of obtaining an abortion does
not present an undue burden in and of itself; that increase in cost or inconvenience would have to
rise to the level of actually preventing women from having access to an abortion before it would
become an unconstitutional undue burden. 187 The court only upheld the disclosure at issue,

Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 37-10-301 to -307 and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 24 (collectively "the Act"), the majority
engages in an inappropriate analysis under an erroneous standard of review, thereby disavowing its obligation to
follow the law and Supreme Court precedent. The majority's decision turns Roe, Bellotti II, Casey. and their
progeny on their heads inasmuch as the statutory requirements imposed by the Tennessee legislature make it a
practical impossibility for a minor to obtain an abortion without first consulting or notifYing a parent to seek the
parent's permission. That is to say, the majority's overreaching holding effectively nullifies a minor female's right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy without parental consent as guaranteed to her by the Constitution and Supreme
Court precedent, because to say that the minor female has the right to have an abortion without parental consent as
long as she overcomes extreme logistical hurdles is to say that she has no right at all.").
181
/d. at 470.
·
182
/d ("The majority conspicuously fails to note those specific findings of fact upon which the district court
concluded that the twenty-four hour notice of appeal filing requirement imposed an undue burden on female minors
such that the provision would likely be found unconstitutional. The majority's calculated decision to ignore the
district court's specific factual findings in all likelihood results from the majority's desire to improperly substitute its
judgment for that of the district court, and the majority could not do so without engaging in an improper standard of
review or risk exposing its self-serving purpose. As such, I specifically note the district court's findings which are an
accurate and realistic determination of the logistical hurdles faced by these female minors in securing an abortion
without parental knowledge, as well as the court's proper conclusions of law.").
183
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
184
Id at 480.
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186 /d.
187

/d at 482.

however, after concluding that the disclosure provision of the informed consent statute could be
construed to mandate only a topic of discussion, of which the physician could tailor the content
based on his best medical judgment and the particular circumstances of the woman. 188 The court
cautioned against incorporating mandatory disclosures of specific information that limit
physicians' discretion and medical judgment. 189
Years after Karlin, lower courts continue to express uncertainty and insecurity in
applying the undue burden standard The Okpalobi v. Foster 190 case reveals puzzlement with
regard to when courts are permitted to apply the undue burden standard. 191 The Fifth Circuit
struggled with the "purpose" prong of the analysis, and commented that the plurality in Casey
neglected to provide adequate guidance as to how lower courts should conduct that portion of the
analysis. 192 In attempting to apply the undue burden standard and engage in the "purpose" prong
of the analysis, the court concluded that a legislature does not have to expressly admit to an
improper purpose in order for courts to find one, and that courts should consider "indicia of
improper legislative purpose, such as statutory language, legislative history and context, and
related legislation" in its · "purpose" analysis. 193 The dissent agreed that the law had an
impermissible purpose, and objected on other grounds. 194

188
189

Jd at 473.
/d. ("While AB 441 does strictly require that physicians must provide their patients with information on a number

of specific topics, the district court's interpretation of the informed consent requirements allows the physician to use
his or her best medical judgment in determining the exact nature or content of that information.").
190
190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999) on reh 'g en bane, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
191
Id at 354.
192
Id ('The Casey Court provided little, if any, instruction regarding the type of inquiry lower courts should
undertake to determine whether a regulation has the 'purpose' of imposing an undue burden on a woman's right to
seek an abortion.").
193/d.
194

Id at 361 ("I respectfully dissent because of the elementary and fundamental errors that the majority has made in
its reaction to a statute plainly aimed at making medical practice more difficult for abortion doctors. The statute may
well constitute an unfair legislative act, but that legislative unfairness cannot be corrected by an unconstitutional
judicial act. In sum, this case presents no case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution and, consequently,
we have no constitutional authority to decide its merits.").

On rehearing en bane, the court reached almost exactly the opposite result. 195 The
majority concluded that the court lacked Article III jurisdiction and that the matter extended
beyond the scope of their powers. 196 The dissent, however, argued that injunctive relief was t!Je
traditional avenue of recourse for facial challenges to abortion statutes, citing Casey and a
number of other cases that would seem to grant circuit courts the authority to decide the case on
the merits. 197 Referencing the statute in question, the dissent stated that its purpose was unlawful
both because it presented an undue burden that unconstitutionally infringed upon a fundamental
right, but also because it was crafted in a way that attempted to circumvent judicial review .. 98
The fact that courts are unclear not only about how to apply the undue burden standard but also
when it is applicable, demonstrates how flawed the standard is. Okpalobi v. Foster is not the

only instance in which a circuit court ruled on an abortion provision only to be reversed on a
hearing en banc} 99
In A Woman's Choice- East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman/ 00 the Seventh Circuit took
advantage of the ambiguity present in the undue burden standard, and interpreted the standard as
it saw fit. 201 The court did not even make a good-faith inquiry into what the Supreme Court
Justices intended, stating instead that, since the Casey Court did not give more guidance as to
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Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,409 (5th Cir. 2001).
·
Jd ("Sitting as an en bane court, we consider whether the district court properly enjoined the "operation and
effect" of the Louisiana state tort statute at issue, which provides a private cause of action against medical doctors
performing abortions. Although, in this facial attack on the constitutionality of the statute, consideration of the
merits may have strong appeal to some, we are powerless to act except to say that we cannot act: these plaintiffs
have no case or controversy with these defendants, the Governor and Attorney General of Louisiana, and
consequently we lack Article III jurisdiction to decide this case.").
197
Id. at 453.
198
/d. at 443 ("This purpose is illegitimate not only because Act 835 unduly burdens a constitutionally protected
rifht, but also because it seeks to evade judicial review.").
19
See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011) opinion vacated in part on reh'g en bane
sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011) and on
reh'g en bane in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012).
200
305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
201
Id at 699.
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what exactly the term "large fraction" means, they would not "peer into the dark abyss of
speculation" to figure out when the amount of women affected becomes a "large fraction.' 0202
Instead, the majority simply concluded that a statute or regulation that prevents some, but not all,
women from having an abortion is constitutional. 203 The majority scoffed at the dissent's
suggestion that a statute that prevents even just one percent of women from obtaining an abortion
can be an undue burden, if that regulation only affects one percent of women to begin with. 204
In response, the dissent reminded the majority that the statute should be analyzed based
on the impact it has on those to which it applies, 205 and even submitted that the majority
impermissibly applied the Salerno standard, instead of the appropriate undue burden standard. 206
The dissent also took liberty with the "under burden" standard, however, by asserting more
definitively than the Casey Court, "there are both unconstitutional ways in which costs may be
raised and constitutional ones: an increased cost is unconstitutional if it is has the purpose or
effect offorcing some women to give up their constitutional right to choose abortion; it is
constitutional if it genuinely furthers the state's legitimate interest in persuading women not to
select abortion when faced with an unwanted pregnancy."207 Though subtly different from what
the Casey Court actually articulated, this is the type of reserved interpretation necessary to

ld.
ld.
204 /d.
205
Newman, 305 F.3d at 709.
.
206
Id at 706-07 ("The first question-how many women must be affected-is really another way of putting the
question about facial challenges that the majority addresses. In this connection, despite its disclaimers, one is left
with the strong impression that the majority is applying either United States v. Salerno, or something very close to it.
In essence, it holds that a state statute like the one before us now would be unconstitutional only if there was no set
of circumstances under which it was valid-by which it seems to mean that not a single woman in Indiana would
find the law's burdens tolerable. This is an impermissible back-door application of Salerno. Worse yet, it assumes
the answer to the question before us: whether the system Indiana wants to put in place will unduly burden Indiana
women. Since the pertinent part of the statute has never gone into force, the majority indulges in the presumption
that the law imposes no burden at all. But this presumption is found nowhere in our jurisprudence, at least for laws
implicating fundamental constitutional rights. Furthermore, this methodology is inconsistent with Casey.").
207
ld. at 705.

202

203

specifically define the undue burden standard and give it substance. 208 The dissenting opinion
was well within the holding of Casey, but simply attempted to refine its terminology. 209
More recently, in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey/ 10 t!te
Fifth Circuit neglected to even apply the undue burden standard because the Plaintiff, in a
display of artful pleading, only raised compelled speech claims. 211 The Fifth Circuit erred by
failing to apply the undue burden standard, however, as the Supreme Court "established the
undue burden test as the sole standard for assessing the constitutionality of an abortion
regulation, rather than as a threshold inquiry for triggering strict scrutiny review." 212
Furthermore, the Lakey court erroneously stated that, under Casey, the manner in which
physicians provide information is irrelevant. 213 In fact, the Court in Casey did state that how the
information is delivered could impact its constitutionality, particularly if it is intended to "shock"
the woman or inflict psychological distress. 214
The Lakey court also misstated or misunderstood the holding in Casey when it wrote:
the requirement that, to avoid the description of the sonogram
images, a victim of rape or incest might have to certify her status
as a victim, despite fearing (by the very terms of the certification)
physical reprisal if she makes her status known ... does not
transgress the First Amendment. If the State could properly decline
to grant any exceptions to the informed-consent requirement, it
cannot create an inappropriate burden on free speech rights where
208

/d.

209 Jd.
210

667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 20 12).
Id. at 577.
212
Casey v. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 853-54 (3d Cir. 1994).
213
Lakey, 661 F.3d at 580 ("Casey did not analyze the doctor's status based on how he provided 'specific
information."').
·
214
Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 ("To this end, when the State requires the provision of certain information, the State may
not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict psychological abuse, designed to shock or unnerve a woman
seeking to exercise her liberty right. This, for example, would appear to preclude a State from requiring a woman to
view graphic literature or films detailing the performance of an abortion operation. Just as a visual preview of an
operation to remove an appendix plays no part in a physician's securing informed consent to an appendectomy, a
preview of scenes appurtenant to any major medical intrusion into the human body does not constructively inform
the decision of a woman of the State's interest in the preservation of the woman's health or demonstrate the State's
profound respect for the life of the unborn.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
211

"\I

it simply conditions an exception on a woman's admission that she
falls within it.215
The Casey Court, however, invalidated the spousal notification requirement precisely because of
the safety issues it raised for affected women and their families. 216 Perhaps the Lakey court
realized some of the flaws of its evaluation of this informed consent law when it wrote, "[w]e
must and do apply today's rules as best we can without hubris and with less sureness than we
would prefer."217
The most recent cases that have grappled with the undue burden standard are a series of
related cases referred to in this Comment as Rounds /, Rounds II, and Rounds Ill. 218 All three of
these cases involved the same informed consent provision, and each of the cases contain
involved dissenting opinion. 219 In Rounds I, the majority granted a preliminary injunction on the
basis that the provisions were unconstitutional, focusing mainly on the fact that it required
physicians to orally convey specific information. 220 The majority wrote, "[i]n no case has the
Court extended the bounds of permissible regulation to laws which force unwilling speakers
themselves to express a particular ideological viewpoint about abortion. m 21 The dissent in this
case construed the undue burden standard very liberally, stating that "statute does not constitute
an undue burden unless it in a "real sense deprive[s] women of the ultimate decision,"222 that a
state's interest in protecting fetal life implies that a state can use physicians "to inform its
215

Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94 (''The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number
of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to
obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the
significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from
~rocuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.").
17
Lakey, 661 F.3d at 585.
218
Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 722 (8th Cir. 2006) (Rounds I), Planned Parenthood
Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 753 (8th Cir. 2008) (Rounds II), and Planned Parenthood
Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (Rounds III).
219 Id.
220
Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 722-23 (8th Cir. 2006).
216

221/d.
222

/d. at 734.

citizens about the 'philosophic and social arguments' against abortion,"223 and that the patient
only has a limited right not to listen. 224 The dissent went even further, stating that, under the
undue burden standard, a state was permitted to use a definition that is intentionally "freighted"
in order to emphasize its interest in fetal life. m As this Comment has discussed, however, the
manner in which information is conveyed cannot be intended to "shock."226
In Rounds II the majority echoed the opinion of the dissent in Rounds I, finding that the

categorization of a fetus as a "whole, separate, unique living human being"227 was simply
biological information that was "at least as relevant to the patient's decision to have an abortion
as the gestational age of the fetus, which was deemed to be relevant in Casey. "228 The majoniy
neglected to engage in a discussion about the legislature's purpose in employing this definition
of the word "fetus," or the effect that this definition might have on women. 229 The dissent, on the
other hand, felt that the disclosures of the provision at hand far surpassed the mandates of
informed consent laws that had been upheld by the Supreme Court and circuit courts in the
past.230 The dissent stated "[r]ather than focusing on medically relevant and factually accurate
information designed to assist a woman's free choice," which the Supreme Court and circuit
courts have upheld, the provision at issue "expresses ideological beliefs aimed at making it more
difficult for women to choose abortions" and that "[t]he obvious objective of the Act ... is to use
the concept of'informed consent' to eliminate abortions." 231
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/d. at 734-35.
Id at 735.
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Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Supra p. 31 note 214.
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Id at 740-41.

More specifically, with regard to the provision that defined a fetus as a "whole, separate,
unique, living human being," the dissent found that the state was mandating the dissemination ~f
"metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state interest in regulating the practice of
medicine," and that "[s]ince the state can assert no legitimate interest in defending the
compulsory communication of ideological statements which do not pertain to its regulation of
the practice of medicine, these provisions can not withstand constitutional scrutiny."232 The
dissent also disapproved of a suicide advisory, which was the focus of the Eighth Circuit's en

bane analysis in Rounds III. With regard to the suicide advisory, the dissent found that the
"broad mandate about psychological distress and suicide ideation is unlike the requirements in
other informed consent laws found to be constitutional, which entrusted the communication of
particular medical risks to the doctor's best professionaljudgment. .. " 233
In contrast, the majority in Rounds III found that "[ o]n its face, the suicide advisory
presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor a violation of physicians' free speech
rights." 234 Though the majority evaluated whether the information required in the disclosure was
truthful and non-misleading, that was the extent of its undue burden analysis. 23 s The majority
opinion focused on whether the language of the provision implied that there was direct causality
between abortion and suicide. 236 Finding that it did not, and that it only suggested "increased
risk," the majority decided that despite medical uncertainty, the advisory was truthful and nonmisleading. 237 The majority neglected to engage in a discussion about the effect of the regulation
or whether it placed a "substantial obstacle" in the path of the woman. 238 The court simply
232

Id at 743.
/d. at750.
234
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23S Id
236 /d.
233

237

/d.

238 Id.

concluded that since the information is truthful and non-misleading it is not an undue burden.21 '.1
In fact, the majority opinion does not even mention the term "substantial obstacle" once, despite
the fact that the term "substantial obstacle" is supposed to define the undue burden standard.240
The dissent took issue with the majority's analysis as well, writing that "[r]ather than
recognizing this emerging consensus based on the scientific research in the record before the
district court and all the subsequently submitted evidence ... the majority theorizes about the
nature of an advisory. In the end it arrives at a new test divorced from the standard established in
Casey." 241

In criticizes the majority's analysis and proposed standard, pointing out the

evidentiary problems that, and writing that, "[u]nder this proposed test, so long as a causal link
between abortion and suicide would be theoretically possible, an advisory is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant unless [plaintiff can prove the absence of a causal link with
'scientifically accepted certainty. "'242
The many varying interpretations of the undue burden standard that have been articulated
in circuit court cases since the Supreme Court adopted the standard in Casey demonstrate the
very vague and ambiguous nature of the standard. 243 Courts are free to pick and choose which
facts are relevant, how to weigh them, and where to draw the lines. 244 This standard is precisely
as Justice Scalia suggested- manipulable. 245 The judicial system rests on the shared belief that it

interprets the United States Constitution. A standard that can be so obviously manipulated ·to
allow judges to infuse their own personal moral and political viewpoints, particularly in such a
controversial area as abortion, suggests that the judiciary is enforcing a political agenda rather
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Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012).
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242
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than the Constitution of the United States, and thereby threatens the legitimacy of the judicial
system. If the undue burden standard is to remain the analysis for evaluating the constitutionality
of abortion regulations, there must be a more consistent and uniform approach to its application,
or the integrity of the judicial system, not to mention women's right to choose, may not endure.
V. RESTORING ORDER TO ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

A. Bringing Strncture and Uniformity Undue Burden Standard

Even assuming that the informed consent statutes are restored to their former integrity and
that paternalistic justifications are abandoned, the undue burden standard must obtain some
structure and uniformity in order to determine what is acceptable and what is not, with reference
to informed consent statutes, but also for future regulations of the abortion procedure. One way
to bring structure to the undue burden standard is to organize some of its elements into- a
disjunctive, three-prong, fact-intensive test. The first step would be to detennine whether the
information is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion. The
second prong would be an investigation into the true purpose of the statute, as evidenced by
legislative history and any other relevant evidence. Finally, courts should investigate what the
effects of the statute are in practice.
These elements are all present in some way in the current undue burden standard, but the
lack of any analytical process allows courts to pick and choose which points to focus on, and
adds to the manipulable nature of the standard. ]leformulating the undue burden standard as a
three-part test will force the courts to address all·the aspects of the standard, thereby creating
some organization and unitbnnity in both analysis and outcome. Perhaps the most important
aspect of this reformulation is that it should be very fact-intensive. Courts should not be able to
ignore the realities of science or the effects of the laws when conducting an analysis. For

example, courts should not be perm itted to conclude that a twenty-four hour waiting period is not
an undue burden because one day is such a short delay, if the ev idence and studies demonstrate
that a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period actually results in a delay of a week or more
for most women. Courts should not be ab le to conclude that infom1ing women that an abortion
can lead to an increased ri sk of suicide or cancer is truth ful and non-misleadi ng and therefore not
unduly burdensome when the rncdical evidence docs not support these claims.
Whether something is an undue burden or a substantial obstacle is more of a conclusion
than a test.

To help circuit courts avoid making arbitrary, inconsistent and unsubstantiated

detem1inations that a regulation imposes an undue burden, the application of the undue burden
standard should be structured into a three-prong analys is composed of the concepts disjointed ly
discussed in Casey. Circuit courts' analyses and eva luations must be heavily concentrated on (I)
whether the information is, in fact, truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have
an abortion (2) the true purpose of the statute or regu lation, and (3) the effect of the statute or
regu lation. As suggested by Justice O'Connor, this should be a heavily factua l analysis.246
Circuit courts should fi rst engage in an analys is of whether the infonnation mandated is
truthfu l, non-misleading, and relevant to the dec ision to have an abortion. First, it should be
taken into consideration whether that jurisdiction is one in which a "physician-based" or
"patient-based" approach to informed consent has been adopted, in order to detem1inc the
relevance of the info rmation.

Furthermore, the an alysis for determining the veracity of the
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Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) ("By basing its rulings on
informed consent and recordkeeping 'on the record,' the Court signaled that it was not announcing a per se rule. At
a minimum, we believe the Court meant that other stmc nbortion lnws requ ire individualized application of the
undue burden standard. Our view is bolstered by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion denying a stay in Fargo
Women 's Health Organization v. Schafe r, which noted: ' the joint opinion [in Casey III] specifically examined the
record developed in the district coun in detennining that Pennsylvania's infonned consent provision did not create
an undue burden.... (T]hc lower couns [in Fargo ] should have undenaken the same analysis,' and '(t]he fact-b ound
nature of the new standard-inquiring if the law is a "substantial obstacle,"' Casey Ill suggests that a challenge after
enforcement of the Pennsylvania Act might yield a different result on its constitutionaliry. ') (internal citatio_ns
omitted).
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information should be a heavily factual analysis, informed by facts, science, studies, and, most
importantly, the medical judgment of the physician, 247 not the opinions and baseless assertions of
the legislature. Information permitted should be limited to truthful, complete, medically relevant
information, as it cannot be fairly stated that med ica lly uncertain or incomplete information is
truthful and non-misleading, or that it accompli shes the goals of informed consent.
Alternatively, if a legislature wa nts to more strongly vo ice its preference fo r chi ldbirth
and its respect for the potential life by making women aware of information that may be
medica lly inconclusive, it should be requ ired to disclose ( I ) the state is vo icing its express
preference for childb irth over abortion, and (2) the information given is inconclus ive.

By

making those disclosures, the legislature is still able to express its preference for childbirth over
abortion, and is still able to make women aware of inconclusive info1mation, but it is not able to
do so manipulatively by passing this information off as being neutral, complete, and certain.
Furthem1ore, any other requirements should be limited to the confines, standards, and
guidelines of medical associat ions and authori ties that govern the medical profession, as the
court itself has stated that it is not a receptacle for the regulati on of the medica l profession. The
details of informed consent and infonnation should be left to the experts, and any information
mandated by the legislature shou ld be limited to the confines of acceptable medical knowledge,
standards, and guideli nes. We must allow the experts in the medical field to in form our laws, not
the other way around.
247

Karlin v. f. oust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999) (" In reaching this conclusion, we arc mindful of the Supreme
Court's admonition !hal a slate abortion statute should not unduly limit a physician's discretion in making medical
determinations. See, e.g., Colaulli, 439 U.S. a1 396-97 (reasoning thai a physician must be afforded adequate
discretion in the exercise of his medical j udgment)."); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 355 (5th C ir. 1999) on
relz 'g en bane, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) ("In Jane L. the Tenth Circuit held unconstilulional a Utah law thai
equated viability with twenty weeks gestational age as measured from conception because, inter alia, the law had
the impem1issible purpose of usurping the physician's responsibility for determining fetal viability and, thus,
providing a vehicle for challenging the holding of Roe v. Wade ... the court also rests its conclusion that the Utah
legislature adopted the measure for a forbidden purpose on the fact that the ac1 on its face denied physicians the
discretion granted them under well-established precedent.").
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After a thorough analysis, and after evaluating the facts, courts can conclude whether the
information is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion. This
must be the primary analysis for two reasons.

First, if a court finds that the mandated

information is not truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, then the undue burden standard is not
implicated. The law at issue would then fall within protections of the First Amendment, and
would fail on First Amendment grounds as compelled speech. Second, because finding that the
legislature is requiring false, misleading, or irrelevant information under the guise of "informed
consent" should be considered when evaluating the true legislative purpose of a statute. If, for
example, a court finds that the information is true, non-misleading, and relevant, this finding
would bolster the legislature's argument that the stated purpose is to further the legitimate and
compelling interest of protecting the health and life of the mother as well as the potential life of
the fetus. If, on the other hand, the court were to find that the information mandated were false,
misleading, or irrelevant, it may undermine the state's argument that the stated purpose is to
further the legitimate and compelling interest of protecting the health and life of the mother as
well as the potential life of the fetus.
Assuming that the court finds that the information mandated is adequate and acceptable,
the analysis should proceed to scrutinize the purpose of the statute. The court should not simply
give deference to the stated purpose of the statute. Rather, the court should consider the stated
purpose of the statute, but it should not end there. The court should also consider the nature and
quality of the information being mandated, the legislative history, the state's holistic policy
regarding women's reproductive health, and the legal and medical necessity of the law. While it
is not the court's job to evaluate a state's policy decisions, it is the court's job to ensure that
those policies fall within the boundaries ofthe constitution. If, for example, the legislature were

to pass a law that required steps that served no medical or legal purpose (that were medically and
legally superfluous and irrelevant), then the court must conclude that the legislature was not
attempting to protect the life and health of the mother or the potential life of the fetus. In that
instance, the burden imposed by the law and its dissuasive effects should not be permissible. !f,
however, the court engaged in ( 1) the informational analysis, and found that the disclosures were
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion, and (2) the purpose
analysis, and found that the law served some medically or legally relevant purpose, then any
dissuasive effect the regulation might would likely be permissible and not an undue burden
because of the other legitimate accomplishments of that law.
Finally, assuming that the information required is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant
to the decision to have an abortion, and that the legislature has a permissible purpose for enacting
the legislation, the court should evaluate the effect of the statute or regulation. This step of the
analysis is what courts have tended to focus on up to this point. This analysis, like the rest of the
undue burden analysis, and as suggested by Justice O'Connor, should also be a factual analysis.
This analysis should not rest on the opinions of the judges or legislature as to whether a given
impact is merely an inconvenience or an undue burden. The circuit courts should engage

iti a

factual analysis, informed by studies and statistics from the given state and, where applicable,
testimony from women who have been impacted by the legislation. This is the point in the
analysis where the circuit courts will inevitably have the most discretion, but the courts should
still attempt to create uniformity and consistency. At this point, the analysis is guided by
whether "a substantial portion of affected women, are prevented from obtaining an abortion or
are otherwise facing an undue burden, such as being restricted from "the most common" types of
abortion. The determinations made in each step of this analysis should lead to the conclusion that
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a given regulation is a substantial obstacle or undue burden, and therefore unconstitutional, as
opposed to using the term "substantial obstacle" itself as the test.
This Comment argues that, as Justice O'Connor suggested, a heavy factual analysis is the
only way to make the undue burden standard a workable standard and to avoid arbitrary and
capricious application. Engaging in a factual analysis will force legislatures to stay true to the
purposes of protecting the health and life of the mother and the potential life of the fetus, while
still allowing them to express their preference for childbirth over abortion. Conducting a factual
analysis will also assist circuit court judges in evaluating this very personal, emotional, and
controversial issue rationally, objectively, and free from the infiltration of personal, moral, and
religious, opinions and beliefs. Adopting the proposed solution is the best way to truly protect
the woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, as well as the right to control her
health, her life, and the life of her unborn child. Taking a structured approach .is the best way to
accomplish uniformity and consistency in the application of the undue burden standard, and the
only way to avoid its arbitrary and capricious application.
B. Reviving the Spirit of Informed Consent: Limiting Includable Information to Medical Facts
and Excluding Ideology by Denying Deference to Legislature
The greatest danger with recent informed consent statutes is that they are manipulating
women, who are already in a very vulnerable position, into thinking that they are being given
unbiased, complete information, when in fact. the line of abortion jurisprudence has invited state
legislatures to turn what should be objective, complete, and valuable information, into a covert
vehicle for state ideology. 248 The justification for this has been that abortion is different, because
it involves the termination of a potential life. w' Of course it is true that abortion is different, and
148
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perhaps thi s ideologica l information should be ava ilable to women, but it shou ld not become a
part of an in formed consent procedure. All peop le, including women , assume is straightforward,
objective, medical information because in all other contex ts, it is.
Informed consent fom1s in the abort ion context should be no different than those of any
other medical procedures. They should be limited to sc ientifi c and medical inform ation that is
supported by the weight of authority, inform the patiellt of any included information that is
inconclusive or for wh ich there is disagreement among medi ca l profess iona ls, and be free from
information that is ideo logical or that is not directly related to the procedure. Allowing the state
to express its viewpoint covertly as requ ired inf01111ation in an infom1ed consent statute gives the
state license to manipulate women and prevent them from making a truly informed choice. A
more acceptable approach wou ld be to maintain the integrity of the informed consent procedure,
and create another document in which both ideological perspectives ca n be voiced, giving the
woman fu ll perspective and complete informati on, and the opportunity to weigh each option for
herself.
The informed consent disc losure standards discussed in Part I, namely, the profess ional
practice, reasonable person, and self-determination standards, do not currently play any rote in
the evaluation of the constitutionality of abortion informed consent laws. Although the undue
burden standard does not incorporate these different theories, it should.
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standards will eliminate some of the ambiguity in deciding what is "relevant" to a woman's
decision to have an abortion. Currently, under the undue burden standard, the legislature bas the
greatest authority to decide what is relevant.250 If these standards were considered, however,
abortion informed consent laws would fa ll more in line with each state' s general informed
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consent laws, with regard to who gets to decide the relevance and materiality of certain
information. m

C. Disallowing Paternalism as an Acceptable Justification for Informed Consent Statutes
Many recent informed consent statute requirements, such as mandatory waiting periods,
are justified by the notion that women should make an informed choice and thereby benefit by
being "given" the extra time to reflect upon their options. 252 Different variations of this rationale
have been accepted by a number of courts as being legitimate. This rationale perpetuates
stereotypes about women needing protection and being incapable of making difficult decisions
on their own. This rationale assumes that women do not spend the appropriate amount of time
reflecting on their decision before deciding to get an abortion, and that they could not have
known or understood their options without the mandatory information and waiting period. ln
reality, however, women are quite capable of making these decisions on their own. Studies have
shown that "women who make the decision to have an abortion understand the responsibilities of
parenthood and family life; 253 six in ten are already a parents. 254 More than half of women who
have an abortion say they want a child or another child at a later point in their life. 25 ~ Most cite
concern or responsibility for someone else as a factor in their decision. 256 These studies should
be recognized and valued and should prevent such paternalistic notions about women from being
perceived as legitimate and compelling justifications for these statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
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Perhaps its true that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," but Justice
Scalia was right to retort that "[r]eason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion,"
either.
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Restructuring the undue burden standard into a disjunctive, three-part test, in which in

prong is analyzed using objective criteria and a heavily factual analysis is a comprehensive
approach to making to making the undue burden standard workable in practice. This approach
still allows the states to further its interests in preserving potential life and persuading women to
choose childbirth, but it is also much more effective in protecting women's rights than the undue
burden standard in its current form. Some solution must be adopted, because as it stands the
undue burden is too easily manipulated, and allows states to maneuver around the safeguards the
Court attempted to put into place.
Furthermore, in order to preserve the integrity of the doctrine of informed consent, the
physician-patient relationship, and the medical profession in general, courts must engage in an
independent analysis of the accuracy of mandated factual disclosures, and refrain from the
admittedly easier but ineffective practice of giving deference to legislative fact-finding. m
Furthermore, when considering the purpose of a given statute; paternalistic notions should be
.•.
abandoned as illegitimate and unacceptable justifications for informed consent statutes, and any
other statutes that regulate abortion. By reducing unwarranted judicial deference to legislative
fact-finding, eliminating paternalism, and, only then proceeding to a structured analysis of
constitutionality under the undue burden standard, the federal circuit courts will create greater
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greater deference to the views of the scientific and medical communities at large, rather than deferring to legislative
determinations of medical fact. Such review is imperative to maintain the integrity of informed consent given
legislatures' increasing proclivity to misuse scientific or medical information to achieve a particular, typically
political, end.").
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consistency in the analysis and outcomes of similar cases, increase the legitimacy of the judicial
system, and more effectively protect the rights of women in this delicate and controversial area.

